cleanup-coverage-code
Cleanup ugly code added by code coverage tools during the test process. Like this one `__cov_Ejgcx$XN18CSfmeWn$f7vQ.f['2']++;`.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Package is 11+ years old from a well-established publisher (tunnckocore, 364 approved packages). Version 0.0.0 reflects old npm conventions, not malicious intent. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance on npm by many years; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.0 | 1 / 3 |
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.