cjs-module-lexer
Lexes CommonJS modules, returning their named exports metadata
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/lexer.js | AI (source-diff): The long base64 string is the inlined WebAssembly binary (lexer.wasm), a documented and stable build pattern for this package. Not a malicious payload. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/lexer.mjs | AI (source-diff): Same inlined WASM binary in the ESM build. Stable false positive for this package's build pattern. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): mhdawson1 (Michael Dawson) is a Node.js TSC member; addition is consistent with this package being under the nodejs GitHub org. | ai |
v2.1.1
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.