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call-signature

Parse / Generate Method Signatures

2
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

jamestalmagetwada

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transfer to twada (power-assert author) in 2015; twada has strong track record (298 approved, 0 rejected). ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): twada added as maintainer in 2015 as part of legitimate transfer; highly trusted publisher. ai

Versions (showing 2 of 2)

Version Deps Published
0.0.2 0 / 2
0.0.1 0 / 2

v0.0.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: jamestalmage → twada (on 2015-11-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-11-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.