build
An ant-like build program for node
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:uuid | AI (typosquat): 'build' is a generic English word predating 'uuid' as a popular package; this 5276-day-old package with 44.6k weekly downloads is clearly not a typosquat. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:esbuild | AI (typosquat): 'build' predates 'esbuild' and is a legitimate standalone package; Levenshtein proximity is coincidental for this established package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:walker | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep loaded indirectly through build task plugin architecture. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Build tool dynamically loads task files by design; core architecture pattern for an ant-like build system. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:uglify-js | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep loaded indirectly through build task plugin architecture. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:timespan | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep loaded indirectly through build task plugin architecture. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Build tool spawns child processes to execute build tasks; expected for an ant-like build system. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.4 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 10 / 0 |
v0.1.4
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'solagratiadesigns.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'solagratiadesigns.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'solagratiadesigns.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'solagratiadesigns.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.