browserify-aes
aes, for browserify
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): browserify-aes 0.0.0 is the legitimate initial release of an 11+ year old package by a well-known publisher (calvinmetcalf). The 0.0.0 version number is not indicative of malice here. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:create-hash | AI (dependencies): create-hash is a well-known crypto-browserify package; appropriate dependency for AES key derivation. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:evp_bytestokey | AI (dependencies): evp_bytestokey is a standard crypto-browserify utility for OpenSSL-compatible key derivation; legitimate dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:cipher-base | AI (dependencies): cipher-base is a standard crypto utility; appropriate dependency for AES implementation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:create-hash | AI (phantom-deps): Phantom dependency pattern is normal in crypto-browserify ecosystem; create-hash is referenced in config. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are established crypto ecosystem figures; legitimate team expansion. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dependencies are standard crypto primitives (buffer-xor, cipher-base, create-hash, evp_bytestokey); appropriate for AES library. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher transition from cwmma to dcousens in 2015 is a legitimate handoff within crypto-browserify org; dcousens is an established maintainer. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 2940 days old, predates Sigstore provenance on npm; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.1.1 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.0.8 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.0.7 | 6 / 3 | |
| 1.0.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.0.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.0.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.8.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.8.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.7.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.7.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.7.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.6.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.0 | 2 / 2 |
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-01-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.