bower-json
Read bower.json files with semantics, normalisation, defaults and validation
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from sindresorhus to desandro occurred in 2015 as a legitimate Bower project maintainer transition. Both are well-known npm contributors; no compromise indicators. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): desandro is a well-established npm publisher (174 approved packages, first seen 4075 days ago). Maintainer addition in 2015 reflects a legitimate Bower project handoff. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Established package with clean diff and trusted publisher; missing gitHead is a minor provenance gap, not a security signal for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of Sigstore attestation is a best-practice gap, not a security risk for this well-established, trusted package. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.4 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.8.3 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.8.2 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.8.1 | 4 / 14 | |
| 0.8.0 | 4 / 14 | |
| 0.7.0 | 4 / 13 | |
| 0.6.0 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.4.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 6 |
v0.8.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: sheerun.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-04-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-04-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-07-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.