bourne
JSON parse with prototype poisoning protection
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Documented hapi.js ecosystem transfer from hueniverse to community team (nargonath, devinivy, marsup, nlf). Repo remains under hapijs org. Legitimate handoff, not a hijack. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change reflects the known hapi.js maintainer transition. nargonath is a well-established hapi.js contributor with strong approval track record. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are known hapi.js community contributors; addition is part of the documented ecosystem handoff from hueniverse. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): hueniverse's removal is consistent with their documented departure from hapi.js maintenance; not indicative of compromise. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by maintainer transition period. New hapi.js community team publishing after takeover is expected behavior, not suspicious. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): bourne is a focused single-purpose utility (JSON parse with prototype poisoning protection). Tiny payload and minimal README are appropriate for this type of library. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 4 |
v1.3.3
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (hueniverse) were replaced by new maintainers (nargonath, devinivy, marsup, nlf). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-01-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.