borp
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Test runner intentionally passes process.env to child processes; this is expected and documented behavior. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): borp is a well-known test runner with 900+ days history; not a typosquat of cors. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 6 / 10 |
v1.0.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/mcollina/borp/blob/892896cf706c90cc20e5a0b1c0fa8417956a66e6/borp.js#L131 129 | await execa('node', spawnArgs, { 130 | stdio: 'inherit', > 131 | env: { 132 | ...process.env 133 | }
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.