bole
A tiny JSON logger
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): rvagg migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; publisher change reflects automation, not takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI/CD-automated release with SLSA provenance; consistent with legitimate maintenance resumption. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.0.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 5.0.29 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.28 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.27 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.26 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.25 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.24 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.23 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.22 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.21 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.20 | 2 / 5 |
v6.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.28
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.27
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.26
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.