bodec
bodec =====
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from creationix to mjackson in 2015; both are well-known ecosystem maintainers. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): mjackson is a reputable publisher (1506 approved packages); transfer happened ~10 years ago. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Small utility lib with 1.7M weekly downloads; low-value signals are false positives for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.