bare-v8
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Holepunch native addon; prebuilt .bare binaries for multiple platforms are the documented distribution mechanism. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 4 |
v1.0.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • prebuilds/android-arm/bare-v8.bare • prebuilds/android-arm64/bare-v8.bare • prebuilds/android-ia32/bare-v8.bare • prebuilds/android-x64/bare-v8.bare • prebuilds/darwin-arm64/bare-v8.bare • prebuilds/darwin-x64/bare-v8.bare • prebuilds/ios-arm64-simulator/bare-v8.bare • prebuilds/ios-arm64/bare-v8.bare • prebuilds/ios-x64-simulator/bare-v8.bare • prebuilds/linux-arm64/bare-v8.bare ... and 3 more
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.