babel-regenerator-runtime
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): sebmck and hzoo are both well-known Babel core team members; this 2016 transition is a documented legitimate maintainer handoff within the Babel project. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Signals reflect Babel monorepo publishing patterns (bulk publish, thin shim with no deps/description). hzoo spam flag is a false positive for the Babel project steward. | ai |
v6.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.