babel-preset-stage-3
Babel preset for stage 3 plugins
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): The sebmck→hzoo transition is a well-documented legitimate Babel maintainer handoff in 2016; hzoo is a known Babel core maintainer. This is stable for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Legitimate Babel core package from the official babel/babel monorepo. Spam-flagged maintainers are the actual Babel team; mass-production and tiny payload are expected for a preset package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by years; no provenance is expected for this legacy Babel 6 release. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.24.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 6.22.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 6.17.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 6.16.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 6.11.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 6.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 6.3.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 6.2.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 6.1.18 | 2 / 0 | |
| 6.1.17 | 2 / 0 | |
| 6.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 6.0.15 | 2 / 0 | |
| 6.0.14 | 2 / 0 |
v6.24.1
2 findingsMatched 4 signal(s), weighted score 8: • [S_KNOWN_SPAM_PUBLISHER] Maintainer(s) previously flagged as spam: amasad, jmm, sebmck, thejameskyle, hzoo, loganfsmyth. • [S_PUBLISHER_MASS_PRODUCTION] Maintainer 'loganfsmyth' owns 167 packages, ≥70% share a templated name shape. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 1 code file(s), 3453 bytes total.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.22.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.17.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.16.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-09-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-06-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.