babel-plugin-transform-dead-code-elimination
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:erikdesjardins.io | AI (email-domain): Package is ~10 years old with established history and verifiable GitHub repo. Domain risk is latent but no evidence of active exploitation or compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by years; absence is expected for this era of Babel 6 tooling. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.3 | 1 / 12 | |
| 2.2.2 | 1 / 14 | |
| 2.2.1 | 1 / 14 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 13 |
v2.2.3
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'erikdesjardins.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.2
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'erikdesjardins.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'erikdesjardins.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'erikdesjardins.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'erikdesjardins.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'erikdesjardins.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.2
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'erikdesjardins.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'erikdesjardins.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'erikdesjardins.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.