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babel-helper-explode-class

Helper function to explode class

4
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures No source commit

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

amasadhzoojmmloganfsmythsebmckthejameskyle

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Legitimate transition from sebmck (Babel creator) to hzoo (Babel core maintainer); well-documented team handoff in 2016. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): hzoo, jmm, loganfsmyth are all known Babel core team members; legitimate maintainer additions. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Signals are expected for a Babel internal helper: mass-production from monorepo, no keywords, tiny focused utility. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:babel-traverse AI (phantom-deps): babel-traverse is used in compiled output; phantom-dep detection is a false positive for this package. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:babel-traverse AI (dependencies): babel-traverse is a core Babel ecosystem package maintained by the same org; flagging it as unvetted is a stable false positive for this package. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Babel v6 package predates Sigstore provenance; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this package. ai

Versions (showing 4 of 4)

Version Deps Published
6.8.0 4 / 0
6.1.8 4 / 0
6.0.15 4 / 0
6.0.0 4 / 0

v6.8.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: sebmck → hzoo (on 2016-05-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v6.1.8

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v6.0.15

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v6.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.