async-retry
Retrying made simple, easy and async
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from zeit org account to rauchg (org founder) is a legitimate organizational transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): zeit org account replaced by individual maintainer accounts from the same organization. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:babel-preset-es2015 | AI (phantom-deps): babel-preset-es2015 is referenced in babel config in package.json, not via import — expected pattern. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): ZEIT org → rauchg/leo is a known legitimate transition (Guillermo Rauch is ZEIT/Vercel founder). | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): rauchg and leo are known Vercel (formerly ZEIT) team members. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Vercel package with 21.8M weekly downloads and strong publisher track record; lack of provenance attestation is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): async-retry is a legitimate, widely-used Vercel package with 21.8M weekly downloads. The bogus-package signals (mass production, no keywords, inflated semver) are false positives for this well-established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.3 | 1 / 12 | |
| 1.3.1 | 1 / 12 | |
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 12 | |
| 1.2.3 | 1 / 12 | |
| 1.2.2 | 1 / 12 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.1.4 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.1.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.1.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 16 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 16 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 16 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 16 |
v1.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.1
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (alexaltea, anatrajkovska, andybitz, arunoda, arzafran, atcastle, caarlos0, cleishm, codetheory, coetry, dav-is, developit, fivepointseven, gmonaco, guybedford, housseindjirdeh, iamevilrabbit, igorklopov, ijjk, janicklas-ralph, jaredpalmer, javivelasco, jkrems, joecohens, juancampa, keanulee, kikobeats, leo, lfades, lucleray, manovotny, marcosnils, matheuss, mfix22, mglagola, msweeneydev, nkzawa, paco, paulogdm, prateekbh, quietshu, rabaut, ragojose, rauchg, sarupbanskota, skllcrn, spanicker, styfle, timer, timneutkens, tootallnate, umegaya, williamli, zeit-bot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (alexaltea, anatrajkovska, andybitz, arunoda, arzafran, atcastle, caarlos0, cleishm, codetheory, coetry, dav-is, developit, fivepointseven, gmonaco, guybedford, housseindjirdeh, iamevilrabbit, igorklopov, ijjk, janicklas-ralph, jaredpalmer, javivelasco, jkrems, joecohens, juancampa, keanulee, kikobeats, leo, lfades, lucleray, manovotny, marcosnils, matheuss, mfix22, mglagola, msweeneydev, nkzawa, paco, paulogdm, prateekbh, quietshu, rabaut, ragojose, rauchg, sarupbanskota, skllcrn, spanicker, styfle, timer, timneutkens, tootallnate, umegaya, williamli, zeit-bot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.3
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (arunoda, codetheory, hharnisc, iamevilrabbit, igorklopov, jamo, javivelasco, joecohens, leo, matheuss, nkzawa, olliv, rauchg, timneutkens, tootallnate). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-09-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.2
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (arunoda, codetheory, hharnisc, iamevilrabbit, igorklopov, jamo, javivelasco, joecohens, leo, matheuss, nkzawa, olliv, rauchg, timneutkens, tootallnate). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-09-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (arunoda, iamevilrabbit, igorklopov, jamo, javivelasco, leo, lipp, matheuss, nkzawa, olliv, qix, rauchg, sergiodxa, timneutkens, tootallnate, zeit-admin, zeit-bot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (arunoda, iamevilrabbit, igorklopov, jamo, javivelasco, leo, lipp, matheuss, nkzawa, olliv, qix, rauchg, sergiodxa, timneutkens, tootallnate, zeit-admin, zeit-bot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.4
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (deniscapp, rauchg, tootallnate, sergiodxa, qix, olliv, nkzawa, leo, jamo, igorklopov, arunoda, matheuss, zeit-admin). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-10-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.3
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (leo, rauchg). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-07-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (leo, rauchg). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-06-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (leo, rauchg). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-06-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (leo, rauchg). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (zeit) were replaced by new maintainers (leo, rauchg). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-02-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.