application-services
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established publisher with long track record; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:knifecycle | AI (dependencies): knifecycle is a first-party dep from the same author (nfroidure); stable across versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:common-services | AI (dependencies): common-services is a first-party dep from the same author (nfroidure); stable across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.0.1 | 5 / 20 | |
| 9.0.0 | 5 / 20 | |
| 8.0.1 | 5 / 20 | |
| 8.0.0 | 5 / 20 |
v9.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.