appium-ios-device
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Appium org migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance attestation — a legitimate and encouraged supply chain improvement, not a takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Appium is a well-established org; dormancy followed by CI/CD-automated publishing with SLSA attestation is consistent with legitimate maintenance resumption. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package publishes via GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; this is the expected pattern for the appium org's automated release pipeline. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:source-map-support | AI (phantom-deps): source-map-support is a declared runtime dep used in config/build output; phantom-dep detection is a false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): The dynamic require resolves a hardcoded relative path to the package's own package.json for version metadata — not a true dynamic require vulnerability. Stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.14 | 7 / 16 | |
| 3.1.13 | 8 / 17 | |
| 3.1.12 | 8 / 17 | |
| 3.1.11 | 8 / 17 | |
| 3.1.10 | 8 / 17 | |
| 3.1.9 | 8 / 17 | |
| 3.1.8 | 8 / 17 | |
| 3.1.7 | 8 / 17 | |
| 3.1.6 | 8 / 18 | |
| 3.1.5 | 8 / 18 | |
| 3.1.4 | 9 / 18 | |
| 3.1.3 | 9 / 18 | |
| 3.1.2 | 9 / 18 | |
| 3.1.1 | 9 / 18 | |
| 3.1.0 | 9 / 18 | |
| 3.0.1 | 10 / 18 | |
| 3.0.0 | 10 / 18 |
v3.1.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.