appium-adb
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): appium-adb now publishes via GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance. This is a legitimate and encouraged supply chain improvement for the official Appium org package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal is consistent with migration to automated GitHub Actions publishing for the official Appium org package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy signal is an artifact of publisher account change; the Appium project is actively maintained. SLSA provenance confirms legitimate CI/CD release. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): appium-adb launches Android emulator subprocesses and correctly merges process.env with caller-supplied env overrides. This is standard subprocess launcher behavior, not credential exfiltration. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decoding is used to write certificate files for openssl x509 hash computation during Android cert installation — a legitimate, documented ADB workflow. | ai |
Versions (showing 35 of 35)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 15.0.0 | 7 / 22 | |
| 14.6.1 | 7 / 22 | |
| 14.6.0 | 7 / 22 | |
| 14.5.0 | 7 / 22 | |
| 14.4.0 | 7 / 20 | |
| 14.3.5 | 8 / 21 | |
| 14.3.4 | 8 / 21 | |
| 14.3.3 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.3.2 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.3.1 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.3.0 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.2.2 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.2.1 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.2.0 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.1.11 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.1.10 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.1.9 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.1.8 | 9 / 22 | |
| 14.1.7 | 9 / 23 | |
| 14.1.6 | 9 / 23 | |
| 14.1.5 | 9 / 23 | |
| 14.1.4 | 10 / 24 | |
| 14.1.3 | 10 / 24 | |
| 14.1.2 | 10 / 24 | |
| 14.1.1 | 10 / 23 | |
| 14.1.0 | 10 / 23 | |
| 14.0.7 | 10 / 23 | |
| 14.0.6 | 10 / 23 | |
| 14.0.5 | 10 / 23 | |
| 14.0.4 | 10 / 23 | |
| 14.0.3 | 10 / 23 | |
| 14.0.2 | 10 / 23 | |
| 14.0.1 | 10 / 23 | |
| 14.0.0 | 10 / 23 | |
| 12.12.1 | 10 / 22 |
v15.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.3.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.3.2
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/appium/appium-adb/blob/752172bc9bb2b6846c5324aca8e5b35bd8b7d150/lib/tools/system-calls.ts#L923 921 | } 922 | const proc = new SubProcess(emulatorBinaryPath, launchArgs, { > 923 | env: {...process.env, ...env}, 924 | }); 925 | await proc.start(0);
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.0.7
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v14.0.6
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v14.0.5
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v14.0.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v14.0.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v14.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v14.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v14.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v12.12.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.