app-root-path
Determine an app's root path from anywhere inside the app
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:http://cmorrell.com | AI (email-domain): The author field contains a URL, not an email address — the analyzer is misinterpreting a malformed author field. No real domain hijack risk; maintainer identity is anchored to the inxilpro GitHub org. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require is the core documented feature of this package — it resolves modules relative to the app root. This is intentional, not malicious. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 2.2.1 | 0 / 12 | |
| 2.2.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 12 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 11 |
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.