antd-img-crop
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with 114 versions and 2700+ days of history; lack of Sigstore provenance is expected for packages predating widespread adoption. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.30.0 | 2 / 34 | |
| 4.29.0 | 2 / 34 | |
| 4.28.0 | 2 / 33 | |
| 4.27.0 | 2 / 33 | |
| 4.26.0 | 2 / 33 | |
| 4.25.0 | 2 / 33 |
v4.30.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.27.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.26.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.25.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.