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allure-js-commons

npm Repository Homepage
12
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

qameta-botbaeveroshenkoamjust-boris

Keywords

allurecodeceptjscypressjasminejestjunitmochanewmanplaywrightpostmanreportreportertesttestingtestopsvitest

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Org migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; canonical repo URL unchanged. ai
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): 558-day gap followed by GitHub Actions publisher transition; consistent with CI migration, not takeover. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:md5 AI (phantom-deps): md5 is listed as a runtime dependency and used in the compiled output; phantom-dep heuristic false positive. ai

Versions (showing 12 of 12)

Version Deps Published
3.7.1 1 / 13
3.7.0 1 / 13
3.4.3 1 / 24
3.4.2 1 / 24
3.4.1 1 / 24
3.4.0 1 / 24
3.3.3 1 / 24
3.3.2 1 / 24
3.3.1 1 / 24
3.3.0 1 / 24
3.2.2 1 / 24
2.15.1 3 / 28

v3.7.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.7.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: qameta-bot → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.4.3

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.4.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.4.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.4.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.3.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.3.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.3.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.3.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.2.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.15.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.