ai-gateway-provider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/g4brym | AI (email-domain): The 'email' field contains a GitHub profile URL, not an actual email address. This is a data entry quirk, not a claimable domain. No hijack risk exists. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ai | AI (phantom-deps): The 'ai' package is a legitimate runtime dependency for this AI SDK gateway provider; phantom-dep detection is a false positive for this package's use pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 3.1.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 3.1.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.3.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.3.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.2.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.1.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.2 | 3 / 3 |
v3.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/g4brym' uses domain 'https://github.com/g4brym' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/g4brym' uses domain 'https://github.com/g4brym' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/g4brym' uses domain 'https://github.com/g4brym' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/g4brym' uses domain 'https://github.com/g4brym' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/g4brym' uses domain 'https://github.com/g4brym' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.5
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/g4brym' uses domain 'https://github.com/g4brym' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/g4brym' uses domain 'https://github.com/g4brym' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.