aedes-persistence-mongodb
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established moscajs ecosystem package; absence of Sigstore provenance is not a risk for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.4.2 | 4 / 7 | |
| 9.4.1 | 4 / 7 | |
| 9.4.0 | 4 / 7 | |
| 9.3.1 | 4 / 7 | |
| 9.3.0 | 4 / 7 | |
| 9.2.0 | 4 / 7 |
v9.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.