aedes
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Fires in benchmarks/runBenchmarks.js only; standard pattern for forwarding env to child processes, not a production secret leak. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:redis | AI (typosquat): aedes is a well-known MQTT broker with no relation to redis; Levenshtein match is a false positive. | ai |
v1.0.2
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/moscajs/aedes/blob/fc3647511bd709b442f5998fe8c6eda90183dad8/benchmarks/runBenchmarks.js#L17 15 | 16 | function spawn (script, cmdArgs = [], msgType = 'rate', args = {}) { > 17 | const child = fork(script, cmdArgs, { env: { ...process.env, ...args } }) 18 | const results = [] 19 | child.on('message', msg => {
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.