@yarnpkg/pnp
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:lib/esm-loader/built-loader.js | AI (source-diff): Brotli-compressed PnP hook blob is the documented build artifact for this package; confirmed in official yarnpkg/berry repo. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:lib/index.js | AI (source-diff): Same brotli-compressed hook pattern embedded in the bundled index.js; stable build artifact for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pino | AI (typosquat): Scoped @yarnpkg/ package; not a typosquat of pino. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped @yarnpkg/ package; not a typosquat of pg. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/node | AI (phantom-deps): @types/node is a type-only dep; not imported at runtime, stable false positive. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Brotli-compressed bundled ESM loader hook; documented build artifact for the Yarn PnP runtime. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): Scoped @yarnpkg/ package; not a typosquat of yup. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.6 | 2 / 10 | |
| 4.1.5 | 2 / 10 | |
| 4.1.4 | 2 / 10 | |
| 4.1.3 | 2 / 10 | |
| 4.1.2 | 2 / 10 |
v4.1.6
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.