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@yarnpkg/fslib

npm Repository
30
Versions
BSD-2-Clause
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

arcanisyarnbot

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): yarnbot is the official Yarn project automation account used for publishing Berry monorepo packages; transition from arcanis is a known legitimate handoff to CI-based publishing. ai
email-domain unclaimed-email:rome.tools AI (email-domain): [email protected] belongs to Sebastian McKenzie (sebmck), a well-known JS ecosystem contributor. Domain lapse is a known artifact of the Rome→Biome project transition, not an active hijack risk for this package. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): sebmck and cpojer are legitimate, well-known JS ecosystem contributors. Spam flags are false positives for this established Yarn Berry monorepo package. ai

Versions (showing 30 of 30)

Version Deps Published
3.1.5 1 / 1
3.1.4 1 / 1
3.1.3 1 / 1
3.1.2 1 / 1
3.1.1 1 / 1
3.1.0 1 / 1
3.0.2 1 / 1
3.0.1 1 / 1
3.0.0 1 / 1
2.10.4 2 / 0
2.10.3 2 / 0
2.10.2 2 / 0
2.10.1 2 / 0
2.10.0 2 / 0
2.9.0 2 / 0
2.8.0 2 / 0
2.7.1 2 / 0
2.7.0 2 / 0
2.6.2 2 / 0
2.6.1 2 / 0
2.6.0 2 / 0
2.5.2 2 / 0
2.5.1 2 / 0
2.5.0 2 / 0
2.4.0 2 / 0
2.3.0 2 / 0
2.2.2 2 / 0
2.2.1 2 / 0
2.2.0 2 / 0
2.1.0 2 / 0

v3.1.5

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: arcanis → yarnbot (on 2025-11-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: yarnbot → arcanis (on 2025-09-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.1.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.1.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.0.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: arcanis → yarnbot (on 2023-10-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.10.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.10.3

2 findings
HIGH Unclaimed maintainer email domain: rome.tools email-domain

Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'rome.tools' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.10.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.10.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.10.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.9.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.8.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.7.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.7.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.6.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.6.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.6.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.5.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.5.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.5.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.4.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.3.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.2.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.2.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.