@xyo-network/react-chain-transfer-plugin
XYO Layer One API
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dep is an in-ecosystem sibling package at matching version; low risk for this package family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent with all other xyo-network packages in this ecosystem; no provenance is org-wide norm. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.13 | 2 / 82 | |
| 1.22.0 | 2 / 125 | |
| 1.20.16 | 5 / 93 | |
| 1.18.1 | 9 / 10 | |
| 1.17.3 | 9 / 10 | |
| 1.16.23 | 9 / 10 | |
| 1.16.18 | 9 / 10 | |
| 1.16.17 | 9 / 10 | |
| 1.16.13 | 9 / 10 | |
| 1.16.3 | 11 / 10 | |
| 1.12.7 | 3 / 19 |
v2.0.13
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atrouw.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (atrouw) than the most recent previously approved version (jonesmac) on 2026-06-12, but atrouw is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.22.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.20.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.18.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.17.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.16.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.16.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.16.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.16.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.16.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.12.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.