@workday/canvas-kit-labs-react
Canvas Kit Labs is an incubator for new and experimental components. Since we have a rather rigorous process for getting components in at a production level, it can be valuable to make them available earlier while we continuously iterate on the API/functi
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Transition to automated CI publishing; human maintainer removal is expected alongside GitHub Actions publisher. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Workday org migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this package going forward. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@workday/design-assets-types | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@workday/canvas-kit-styling | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@workday/canvas-tokens-web | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Workday org package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a risk indicator here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:chroma-js | AI (phantom-deps): Peer/config dependency pattern for UI component library; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@workday/canvas-system-icons-web | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package; config-level reference is expected. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@emotion/styled | AI (phantom-deps): Peer dependency for CSS-in-JS styling; expected for Canvas Kit component library. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash.flatten | AI (phantom-deps): Config-level reference; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@emotion/react | AI (phantom-deps): Peer dependency for CSS-in-JS styling; expected for Canvas Kit component library. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 125)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 14.0.5 | 10 / 1 | |
| 14.0.4 | 10 / 1 | |
| 14.0.3 | 10 / 1 | |
| 14.0.2 | 10 / 1 | |
| 14.0.1 | 10 / 1 | |
| 14.0.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.57 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.56 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.55 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.54 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.53 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.52 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.51 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.50 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.49 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.48 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.47 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.46 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.45 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.44 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.43 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.42 | 10 / 1 | |
| 13.2.41 | 10 / 1 |
v14.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v14.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v14.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v14.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v14.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v14.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v13.2.57
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.56
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.55
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.54
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.53
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.52
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.51
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.50
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.49
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.48
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.47
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.46
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.45
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.2.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.2.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.2.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.2.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.