@willbooster/wb
CLI tool for WillBooster projects
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish (exkazuu) to GitHub Actions CI/CD is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; stable for this package going forward. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:chalk | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep declared in package.json; CLI tool may use it indirectly via config/build patterns. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:yargs | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep declared in package.json; CLI tool uses yargs for argument parsing. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dotenv | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep declared in package.json; stable false positive for this CLI tool. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:globby | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep declared in package.json; stable false positive for this CLI tool. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dotenv-expand | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep declared in package.json; stable false positive for this CLI tool. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:minimal-promise-pool | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep declared in package.json; stable false positive for this CLI tool. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:kill-port | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep declared in package.json; stable false positive for this CLI tool. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @willbooster/wb; Levenshtein match to 'pg' is a false positive with no impersonation intent. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @willbooster/wb; Levenshtein match to 'qs' is a false positive with no impersonation intent. | ai |
Versions (showing 44 of 147)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 13.2.6 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.2.5 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.2.4 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.2.3 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.2.2 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.2.1 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.2.0 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.1.1 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.1.0 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.0.3 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.0.2 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.0.1 | 8 / 28 | |
| 13.0.0 | 8 / 28 | |
| 12.0.2 | 8 / 28 | |
| 12.0.1 | 8 / 28 | |
| 12.0.0 | 8 / 28 | |
| 11.1.3 | 8 / 28 | |
| 11.1.2 | 8 / 28 | |
| 11.1.1 | 8 / 28 | |
| 11.1.0 | 8 / 28 | |
| 11.0.12 | 8 / 28 | |
| 11.0.11 | 8 / 29 | |
| 11.0.10 | 8 / 29 | |
| 11.0.9 | 8 / 29 | |
| 11.0.8 | 8 / 29 | |
| 11.0.7 | 8 / 29 | |
| 11.0.5 | 8 / 29 | |
| 11.0.4 | 8 / 29 | |
| 11.0.3 | 8 / 29 | |
| 11.0.2 | 8 / 29 | |
| 11.0.1 | 7 / 29 | |
| 11.0.0 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.7.3 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.7.2 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.7.1 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.7.0 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.6.19 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.6.18 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.6.17 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.6.16 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.6.15 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.6.14 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.6.13 | 7 / 29 | |
| 10.6.12 | 7 / 29 |
v13.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v12.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v12.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v12.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.7.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.6.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.6.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.6.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.6.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.6.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.6.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.6.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.6.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.