@washingtonpost/eslint-plugin-wpds
WPDS lint rules
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Established WashPost org package with 105 versions; dormancy likely reflects org publishing workflow changes, not takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established WaPo org package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a risk indicator here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.15.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.14.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.1 | 1 / 1 |
v2.15.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.13.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.13.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.