@vueuse/shared
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.d.ts | AI (source-diff): dist/index.d.ts is a bundled TypeScript declaration file with long import lines — not obfuscation. This is standard output for bundled .d.ts files in VueUse packages. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from vueuse-bot to GitHub Actions is a legitimate CI/CD pipeline modernization, confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Missing gitHead is compensated by SLSA provenance attestation which provides stronger cryptographic supply chain integrity guarantees. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): VueUse/shared legitimately uses Reflect.get() inside Proxy traps for Vue reactivity helpers — standard JS pattern, not obfuscation. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/antfu | AI (email-domain): The author field uses a GitHub profile URL as the email value, not an actual email address. This is a known formatting quirk of Anthony Fu's packages and is not a security risk. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): @vueuse/shared is a well-known monorepo sub-package; missing description is a cosmetic issue, not a security signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 14.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 14.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 14.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 14.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 14.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 12.0.0 | 1 / 0 |
v14.3.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v14.2.0
4 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.0
4 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.0.0
3 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v12.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.