@vueuse/metadata
Metadata for VueUse functions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate migration from vueuse-bot to GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; this is an improvement in supply chain security for the vueuse org. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Expected when publishing via GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance attestation; the attestation itself provides stronger commit linkage. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Monorepo sub-package; metadata package doesn't need frequent updates. Major version jump (12→14) indicates active development. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/antfu | AI (email-domain): Author field uses a GitHub URL in the email slot, not an actual email domain. This is a common npm convention and a false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 14.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 14.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 14.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 14.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 14.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 12.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v14.3.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v14.2.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.0.0
3 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v12.0.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/antfu' uses domain 'https://github.com/antfu' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.