@vueuse/components
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from vueuse-bot to GitHub Actions is a documented CI migration; SLSA attestation confirms official repo pipeline. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects publishing cadence change, not takeover; SLSA provenance and org repo URL confirm legitimacy. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/wheatjs | AI (email-domain): Author field contains a GitHub URL, not an email domain; no registerable domain at risk. Stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 14.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 14.2.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 14.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 14.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 14.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 13.1.0 | 2 / 0 |
v14.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.2.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/wheatjs' uses domain 'https://github.com/wheatjs' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.0.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v13.1.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/wheatjs' uses domain 'https://github.com/wheatjs' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.