@vue/devtools-shared
> Internal utility types shared across @vue/devtools packages.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate migration from maintainer account to GitHub Actions CI/CD for the official Vue devtools repo. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Resumption of publishing after CI/CD migration; official Vue org package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Shared utility in a monorepo; minimal README and no keywords are normal for internal packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.1.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 8.1.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 8.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 8.0.7 | 0 / 2 | |
| 8.0.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 8.0.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 8.0.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 8.0.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 8.0.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 8.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 8.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 7.7.9 | 1 / 1 | |
| 7.7.8 | 1 / 1 |
v8.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.0.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.0.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.7.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.7.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.