@vue/composition-api
Provide logic composition capabilities for Vue.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:digital-cult.com | AI (email-domain): Unclaimed domain belongs to a different maintainer (dobri), not the publisher. Does not affect version integrity of this official Vue package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): akryum and linusborg are both Vue core team members; transition is a legitimate team handoff within the official vuejs GitHub org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): dobromir-hristov, linusborg, and lmiller1990 are all known Vue ecosystem contributors; this is a legitimate team expansion for an official vuejs org package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No Sigstore provenance is a best-practice gap, not a security risk for this long-established package from a trusted publisher under the vuejs org. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): antfu is a highly reputable maintainer; missing gitHead reflects a publish environment change, not a security concern for this well-established vuejs org package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/vue-composition-api.common.prod.js | AI (source-diff): Standard minified production build generated by rollup-plugin-terser. Code samples show legitimate Vue 2 composition API internals with no malicious patterns. Stable for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a TypeScript runtime helper; phantom-dep finding is a known false positive for TypeScript-compiled packages. Stable for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/vue-composition-api.prod.js | AI (source-diff): Standard minified production build (UMD format) generated by rollup-plugin-terser. Code samples show legitimate Vue 2 composition API internals. Stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 58 of 58)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.7.2 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.7.1 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.7.0 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.6.3 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.6.2 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.6.1 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.6.0 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.5.0 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.4.9 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.4.8 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.4.7 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.4.6 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.4.5 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.4.4 | 1 / 23 | |
| 1.4.3 | 1 / 23 | |
| 1.4.2 | 1 / 23 | |
| 1.4.1 | 1 / 23 | |
| 1.4.0 | 1 / 23 | |
| 1.3.3 | 1 / 23 | |
| 1.3.2 | 1 / 23 | |
| 1.3.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.2.4 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.2.3 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.2.2 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.1.5 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.1.4 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.1.3 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.1.2 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.0.6 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.0.5 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.6.7 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.6.6 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.6.5 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.6.4 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.6.3 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.6.2 | 1 / 21 | |
| 0.6.1 | 1 / 17 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 17 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 17 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 17 | |
| 0.3.4 | 1 / 17 | |
| 0.3.3 | 1 / 17 | |
| 0.3.2 | 1 / 16 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 15 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 15 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 15 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 15 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 15 |
v1.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v1.4.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v1.4.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v1.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v1.3.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v1.3.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.7
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v0.6.6
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v0.6.5
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v0.6.4
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v0.6.3
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-06-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v0.6.2
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-06-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
v0.6.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'digital-cult.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-12-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.