@vue-oxlint/binding-android-arm-eabi
Placeholder. Real release coming soon.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Explicitly declared placeholder package; 0.0.0 is intentional for this stub. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding package; .node binary is the entire purpose of this shard. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binding shards intentionally have no deps, minimal README, and no keywords. | ai |
v0.14.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vue-oxlint-toolkit.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vue-oxlint-toolkit.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vue-oxlint-toolkit.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.