@voiceflow/voice-types
Voiceflow voice project types
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): vf-serviceaccount is Voiceflow's org-wide CI publisher; transition from individual account is expected for this org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Voiceflow org packages consistently lack provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.11.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.11.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.11.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.11.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.10.60 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.10.57 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.10.56 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.10.55 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.10.54 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.10.53 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.10.52 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.10.51 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.10.50 | 2 / 0 |
v2.11.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.11.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.60
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.57
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.56
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.55
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.54
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.53
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.52
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.51
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.50
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.