@vitest/expect
Jest's expect matchers as a Chai plugin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): vitestbot removal is part of normal CI/CD transition in Vitest project; legitimate handoff to human maintainers. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from vitestbot to GitHub Actions reflects legitimate CI/CD automation transition, not compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): vitestbot is Vitest's CI automation account; legitimate for automated releases. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @types/chai is a type definition for existing chai dependency; low-risk addition for testing library. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:chai | AI (dependencies): Chai is a core assertion library for this package's purpose; version constraint is reasonable and stable. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@types/chai | AI (dependencies): @types/chai is a standard TypeScript definition package for chai; stable for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects monorepo release cadence, not account takeover; SLSA provenance confirms legitimate CI/CD publishing. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@vitest/utils | AI (dependencies): @vitest/utils is a sibling package in the vitest-dev/vitest monorepo, pinned to the same version. Legitimate and expected dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@vitest/spy | AI (dependencies): @vitest/spy is a sibling package in the vitest-dev/vitest monorepo, pinned to the same version. Legitimate and expected dependency. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/chai | AI (phantom-deps): @types/chai is framework-scoped and loaded by convention; stable for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Flagged maintainers are core Vitest contributors, not spam; false positive in this established project context. | ai |
Versions (showing 62 of 62)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.7 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.1.6 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.1.5 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.1.4 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.1.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.1.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.1.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.1.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.18 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.17 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.16 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.15 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.14 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.13 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.12 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.11 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.10 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.9 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.8 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.7 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.6 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.5 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.4 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 3.1.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 3.1.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 3.1.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 3.0.8 | 4 / 3 | |
| 3.0.6 | 4 / 3 | |
| 3.0.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 3.0.3 | 4 / 3 | |
| 2.1.8 | 4 / 3 | |
| 2.1.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 2.1.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 2.0.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 2.0.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.6.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.5.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.5.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.4.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.2.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.1.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.34.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.34.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.32.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.32.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.31.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.29.8 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.29.6 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.28.5 | 3 / 1 | |
| 4.1.0-beta.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.1.0-beta.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0-beta.19 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0-beta.18 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0-beta.17 | 5 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0-beta.16 | 5 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0-beta.10 | 5 / 1 |
v4.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.34.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.34.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.32.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.32.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.31.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.29.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.29.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.28.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.0-beta.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0-beta.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0-beta.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0-beta.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0-beta.17
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.0-beta.16
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.0-beta.10
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.