@vitejs/plugin-react-swc
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Official vitejs org CI publishing via Sigstore; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher is standard for vitejs org packages; backed by SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Major version release (v4) after v3.x; gap explained by significant rewrite cycle, not account takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @rolldown/pluginutils is a legitimate Vite/Rolldown ecosystem package; expected for v4 migration. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.2.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.2.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.2.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.0 | 1 / 0 |
v4.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.2.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.2.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.