@vercel/fun
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:uid-promise | AI (phantom-deps): uid-promise is a declared runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): Scoped Vercel package; Levenshtein match to 'yup' is a false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.1 | 16 / 17 | |
| 1.3.0 | 18 / 17 | |
| 1.2.1 | 18 / 17 | |
| 1.2.0 | 18 / 17 | |
| 1.1.6 | 18 / 17 |
v1.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.