@umijs/bundler-mako
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): 127.0.0.1 is localhost HMR proxy target; not a remote raw IP — stable false positive for this bundler package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.11.15 | 12 / 0 | |
| 0.11.14 | 12 / 0 | |
| 0.11.13 | 12 / 0 | |
| 0.11.12 | 12 / 0 | |
| 0.11.11 | 12 / 0 | |
| 0.11.10 | 12 / 0 |
v0.11.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.