@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin
TypeScript plugin for ESLint
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:typescript-eslint-parser | AI (dependencies): typescript-eslint-parser was the legitimate predecessor parser used by this plugin before the @typescript-eslint monorepo reorganization; its use in v0.1.0 is expected and not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@typescript-eslint/experimental-utils | AI (dependencies): This is a sibling package within the same typescript-eslint monorepo, always published at the same version. It is a legitimate internal utility dependency, not a suspicious third-party package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:graphemer | AI (dependencies): graphemer is a legitimate, narrow-scoped Unicode string segmentation library; stable dependency for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): typescript-eslint publishes via GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation; this is the expected and documented publish flow for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): New type definitions and build artifacts are expected in routine TypeScript plugin updates; no bundled/injected code risk. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dependencies are all legitimate @typescript-eslint and ecosystem packages; no suspicious additions. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): 5.2x size increase expected for mature linting plugin with feature expansion; no malware indicators. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Automated CI/CD publishing via GitHub Actions does not inject gitHead; SLSA provenance attestation provides stronger commit-level integrity signal. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer addition to established project is normal; no compromise indicators present. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher transition to GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation is a positive supply chain integrity signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance attestation is not yet standard for established packages; not a security concern for this mature project. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@typescript-eslint/type-utils | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same typescript-eslint monorepo, pinned to the same version. Legitimate internal dependency. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Legitimate monorepo package from typescript-eslint org; inflated semver reflects coordinated versioning across packages, not spam. Short README defers to official docs site. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 394)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.60.0 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.59.4 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.59.3 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.59.2 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.59.1 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.59.0 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.58.2 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.58.1 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.58.0 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.57.2 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.57.1 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.57.0 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.56.1 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.56.0 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.55.0 | 8 / 22 | |
| 8.54.0 | 8 / 20 | |
| 8.53.1 | 8 / 20 | |
| 8.53.0 | 8 / 20 | |
| 8.52.0 | 8 / 20 | |
| 8.51.0 | 8 / 20 | |
| 8.50.1 | 8 / 21 | |
| 8.50.0 | 8 / 21 | |
| 8.49.0 | 8 / 21 | |
| 8.48.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.48.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.47.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.46.4 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.46.3 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.46.2 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.46.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.46.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.45.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.44.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.44.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.43.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.42.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.41.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.40.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.39.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.39.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.38.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.37.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.36.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.35.1 | 9 / 20 | |
| 8.35.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.34.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.34.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.33.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.33.0 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.32.1 | 9 / 21 | |
| 8.32.0 | 9 / 22 | |
| 8.31.1 | 9 / 22 | |
| 8.31.0 | 9 / 22 | |
| 8.30.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.30.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.29.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.29.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.28.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.27.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.26.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.26.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.25.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.24.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.24.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.23.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.22.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.21.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.20.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.19.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.19.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.18.2 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.18.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.18.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.17.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.16.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.15.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.14.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.13.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.12.2 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.12.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.12.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.11.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.10.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.9.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.8.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.8.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.7.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.6.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.5.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.4.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.3.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.2.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.1.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.0.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 8.0.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 7.18.0 | 9 / 25 | |
| 7.17.0 | 9 / 25 | |
| 7.16.1 | 9 / 25 | |
| 7.16.0 | 9 / 25 | |
| 7.15.0 | 9 / 25 |
v8.60.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.59.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.59.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.59.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.59.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.58.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.58.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.58.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.57.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.57.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v8.57.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v8.56.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.56.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v8.55.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.54.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.53.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.53.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.52.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.51.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.50.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.50.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.49.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.48.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.48.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.47.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.46.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.46.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.46.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.46.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.46.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.45.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.44.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.44.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.43.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.42.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v8.41.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.40.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.39.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.39.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.38.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.37.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.36.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.35.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.35.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.34.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.34.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.33.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.33.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.32.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.32.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.31.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.31.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.30.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.30.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.29.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.29.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.28.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.27.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.26.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.26.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.25.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.24.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.24.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.23.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.22.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.21.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.20.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.19.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.19.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.18.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.18.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.18.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.17.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.16.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.15.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.14.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.13.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.12.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.12.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.18.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.17.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.16.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.16.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.15.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.