@types/ref-struct
TypeScript definitions for ref-struct
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/loyd | AI (email-domain): The 'email' field contains a GitHub profile URL, not an actual email address. No real email domain to hijack; this is a data quality artifact in the author field, not a security risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/ref | AI (phantom-deps): @types packages declare type dependencies by convention, not direct imports. This is standard DefinitelyTyped practice and stable across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): DefinitelyTyped packages published via the `types` publisher do not use Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across the entire @types ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.33 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.32 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.31 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.30 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.29 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.28 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.27 | 1 / 0 |
v0.0.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.28
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.27
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/loyd' uses domain 'https://github.com/loyd' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.