@types/es6-collections
TypeScript definitions for es6-collections
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:http://github.com/rbuckton | AI (email-domain): The 'email' is actually a GitHub profile URL used as author contact in an old DefinitelyTyped convention. github.com is a valid, claimed domain — not an exploitable unclaimed email domain. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is nearly 10 years old and published by the trusted 'types' publisher (DefinitelyTyped). Lack of provenance is expected and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.37 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.36 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.35 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.34 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.33 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.32 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.31 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.30 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.29 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.28 | 0 / 0 |
v0.5.37
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.36
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.28
2 findingsMaintainer email 'http://github.com/rbuckton' uses domain 'http://github.com/rbuckton' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.