@types/chai-subset
TypeScript definitions for chai-subset
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/delta62/ | AI (email-domain): GitHub URL used as author contact, not a real email domain; stable FP for @types packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@types/chai | AI (dependencies): @types/chai is a well-known DefinitelyTyped package; its use as a dependency in @types/chai-subset is expected and stable across all versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/chai | AI (phantom-deps): @types/chai is a type-level peer dependency loaded by TypeScript convention, not via direct import. This pattern is standard for all DefinitelyTyped packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): DefinitelyTyped/@types packages are published via an automated pipeline that does not currently emit Sigstore provenance. This is a known ecosystem gap, not a risk indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.3.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.3.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.3.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.3.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.29 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.28 | 1 / 0 |
v1.3.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.28
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/delta62/' uses domain 'https://github.com/delta62/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.