@tryghost/mongo-knex
tbc
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.10.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.9.5 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.9.4 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.9.2 | 2 / 11 |
v0.10.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (kevinansfield) than the most recent previously approved version (jonatan-ghost) on 2026-06-12, but kevinansfield is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.9.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jonatan-ghost) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisraible) on 2026-05-29, but jonatan-ghost is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.9.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.