@tmlmobilidade/ssh
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped org package @tmlmobilidade/ssh; Levenshtein match to 'qs' is a false positive with no brand impersonation intent. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 335)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 20251205.1154.10 | 2 / 5 | |
| 20251204.1130.15 | 2 / 5 | |
| 20251202.1821.43 | 2 / 5 | |
| 20251202.1817.5 | 2 / 5 |
v20251205.1154.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20251204.1130.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20251202.1821.43
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20251202.1817.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.