@tmlmobilidade/rabbitmq
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Org-internal utility package; missing description is a style issue, not a risk indicator for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 330)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 20251206.1045.7 | 2 / 6 | |
| 20251205.1154.10 | 2 / 6 | |
| 20251204.1130.15 | 2 / 6 | |
| 20251202.1821.43 | 2 / 6 | |
| 20251202.1817.5 | 2 / 6 |
v20251206.1045.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20251205.1154.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20251204.1130.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20251202.1821.43
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20251202.1817.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.