@thirstie/ecomm-vue
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ramda | AI (phantom-deps): Transitive dependency via @thirstie/thirstieclient; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@vueuse/core | AI (phantom-deps): Transitive dependency via @thirstie/thirstieclient; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@thirstie/assets | AI (phantom-deps): Internal org dependency used transitively; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@thirstie/thirstieclient | AI (phantom-deps): Internal org dependency used transitively; stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.15 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.5.14 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.5.13 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.5.12 | 4 / 0 |
v1.5.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.